GPRS Security Feature, Threats and Solution

Security:

GPRS Authentication

The GPRS authentication procedure is handled in the same way as in GSM with the dis- tinction that the procedures are executed in the SGSN. In some cases, the SGSN requests the pairs for a MS from the HLR/AUC corresponding to the IMSI of the MS.

Threats:

Authentication and Authorization

Spoofed Create PDP Context Request – GTP inherently provides no authentication for the SGSNs and GGSNs themselves. This means that given the appropriate subscriber information, an attacker with access to the GRX, another operator attached to the GRX, or a malicious insider can potentially create their own bogus SGSN and create a GTP tunnel to the GGSN of a subscriber. They can then pretend to be the legitimate subscriber when they are not. This can result in an operator providing illegitimate Internet access or possibly unauthorized access to the network of a corporate customer.

Solution:

Ingress and egress packet filtering – This will help prevent the PLMN from being used as source to attack other roaming partners. If the mobile operator is connected to more than one GRX or private roaming peering connections, then this will also help ensure that spoofed roaming partner traffic cannot arrive on paths where that roaming partner is not connected.